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They must have finally figured
out that units retain their cohesion, teamwork skills and unit
spirit, while the individual replacement system blows away
institutional memory with a bigger bang than a Claymore mine.
The result is too many American kids learning critical
how-to-stay-alive lessons while already in the killing zone.
Another old pro in Iraq
reports: “Hack, recently the guerrillas shot at one of my
patrols with rocket and machine-gun fire. My boys killed all
the bad guys less one. Then this wounded dude started babbling
and apologizing for taking us on.”
The bewildered sergeant asked
the wounded guerrilla what all the apologizing was about. He
replied, “We were instructed to only shoot at the sand-colored
machines – the green-colored machines always shoot back and
then chase us down.”
“Once that trickled down to my
boys, who are out of Vicenza, Italy, and drive green-colored,
camouflaged vehicles,” my friend said, “they were even more
aggressive.”
We owe a big salute to the
heroes who smashed Saddam’s military last March and April as
easily as an Abrams tank can total a beer can. But then our
warriors morphed from conventional fighting to taking on the
guerrillas – in most cases without proper training and without
sufficient troop strength. Apparently, the SecDef's still so
into gold-plated, high-tech stuff that he doesn’t relate to
ground warfare in a guerrilla environment.
Logistics also sucked for the
first six months, leaving our fighters short of everything,
from the basics like food and water to spare parts for mainly
thin-skinned vehicles that soldiers aren’t exactly keen on
using in this fight against a terrorist opponent who is into
roadside bombings and ambushes.
Yes, Iraq proved in spades that
we have outstanding warriors who made a bad plan work and
deserve every accolade bestowed upon them. Not so for many of
the brass – who need to lose the kinder, softer Clintonesque
approach before they do unto the line side of the Army what
they’ve already done unto Jessica Lynch’s service and support
side.
“I know that these new combat
units have good leaders and troops,” says a senior sergeant
who has been in Iraq for 10 months. “But the higher-ups are
pushing them to be passive and not take the fight to the
enemy. The rest of the bad news is what we call the ‘Colonel
West Syndrome.’ For example, the other night when we were
conducting a raid, a target was standing behind a steel door
as our guys breached it, and the door smacked him in the face
and messed up his head. When we turned him into the detention
center, the MPs there accused us of abusing this clown,
kicking off an investigation that got pretty ugly.”
“Gen. Sanchez tore up my very-squared-away battalion
commander for not wearing his Hummer seat belt,” says another
sergeant who’s now finishing up a tour with a parachute
brigade – the famed 173d Airborne – that made a hairy
night-combat jump into Bashur at the beginning of the war and
has been in the thick of it ever since.
“Hello? Where has this general been?” asked the sergeant.
“The terrorists over here have a bad habit of shooting at us –
we have to be able to unass our vehicles in a hurry.”
No question that battling guerrillas requires an
exceptionally disciplined force and that parade-ground regs
don’t extend longevity on a guerrilla battlefield. The brass
need to get down and talk to their fine noncoms quick smart.
The sergeants know how to keep up the initiative – while
keeping U.S. casualties down.
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